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There is now a wide consensus among econo-mists, political scientists and policy makers that
institutions play a role in fiscal policy outcomes and
economic growth. What is still unclear, or there is
less consensus about, is which institutions or cluster
of institutions matter most and how. Also partly
unanswered, in light of the recognition that institu-
tions are not “neutral” in terms of their economic
consequences, is why societies that are remarkably
similar in terms of many economic and political fun-
damentals (e.g. advanced industrial democracy)
choose very different political institutions, including
electoral laws and forms of government. In the fol-
lowing, we discuss why and how economic variables
can affect the choice of political institutions and, in
particular, the choice of a democratic constitution.
Our approach is innovative relative to the political
science literature, which has traditionally treated
political institutions as exogenous and predetermined
by historical and cultural factors. But our emphasis on
the endogeneity of constitutions is also relatively
unusual for the political economy of public finance. In
recent years, scholars working in this field have made
a large effort in trying to quantify the effects of vari-
ous political institutions on economic variables, but
usually relying on the implicit or explicit premise of
regarding institutions as exogenously given.
Classifying democratic constitutions
Democratic constitutions differ in many different
dimensions, and there are numerous features that
are important in shaping economic outcomes.A clas-
sification of democracies that has received a large
consensus in the political science literature and that
we have adopted in our research is the one intro-
duced by Arend Lijphart (Lijphart 1977), who dis-
tinguishes between majoritarian and consensual de-
mocracies. The model of majoritarian democracy, or
the Westminster model, is characterized by the fact
that political power tends to be concentrated in the
hands of a limited number of individuals. In consen-
sual democracies, political power is instead widely
shared and dispersed. There are various institutional
characteristics distinguishing the two democratic
models, but the most important difference is proba-
bly the electoral system. This is majoritarian (plural-
ity rule or first-past-the-post) in majoritarian democ-
racies and proportional in consensual democracies.
There are two other important features that distin-
guish these democratic systems and that are related
to the electoral law. One is the executive-legislative
relation. In majoritarian democracies, there is the
dominance of the executive over the legislative
power, while the power of these two political bodies
is more balanced in the consensual model. The other
feature has to do with the composition of govern-
ment. Majoritarian electoral rules generally lead to
the formation of a two-party system and the leader
of the largest party is also the prime minister. In con-
sensual democracies, by contrast, the proportional
electoral law favors the formation of a multi-party
system, and governments are generally the expres-
sion of coalitions between more parties with the con-
sequence that a greater variety of interests is repre-
sented. Among developed countries, the UK is prob-
ably the most representative example of majoritari-
an democracy, while the consensual model of democ-
racy is best represented by some Scandinavian and
Northern European countries. Many important insti-
tutional elements of the consensual model are also
shared by several other countries of Continental
Europe however.
There are three points that are worth emphasizing.
First, we need to clarify that the electoral rules are
generally not part of the written constitution. Never-
theless, as we can also see from the title of this
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“Forum”, it is common (or natural) in the academic
debate to consider the electoral system part of the
constitution of a country. The reason for this is well
explained by Myerson (1999, 672), who argues that
“Although many countries establish the electoral
systems by organic law outside their formal written
constitution, we consider the electoral system here
to be part of the constitutional structure, because it
is an essential element in the rules of the political
game that politicians must play to win power.”
Second, there are various elements that characterize
an electoral system. The literature has emphasized
three dimensions that are particularly important: the
district magnitude, the electoral formula and the ballot
structure. The district magnitude determines the frac-
tion of the legislature elected in a typical voting dis-
trict. The electoral formula defines how votes are
translated into seats. Under proportional representa-
tion (PR) the number of seats obtained by a party is
proportional to the total votes in each voting district,
while under majoritarian rule the elected representa-
tive in each district is the one that has obtained the
largest share of votes. The ballot structure defines how
voters cast their ballot in the range from single indi-
viduals to party lists. While these characteristics are
theoretically distinct, they are highly correlated in
practice. Majoritarian electoral systems generally have
voting for individual candidates in single-member dis-
tricts. Proportional electoral rules are instead charac-
terized by a system of party lists in large districts.
Third, another key feature of the constitution is the
form of government that, similarly to the electoral sys-
tem, is characterized by various dimensions. The dis-
tinction is generally made between parliamentary and
presidential regimes. In parliamentary systems, the
government is appointed by the elected assembly and
can therefore be dismissed by a vote of nonconfi-
dence. In presidential regimes, the president is elected
directly by citizens and he chooses the executive that
do not need the confidence of the parliament. Lijphart
(1999) and Linz (1994) argue that presidential govern-
ments as such are inherently an expression of majori-
tarian democracy as presidential elections are winner-
takes-all in nature and all the executive power is con-
centrated in the hands of one single person. This is a
point that we will discuss at greater length below.
The effects of electoral rules and other constitution-
al features on fiscal policy outcomes have been stud-
ied extensively in the economic and political science
literature. Some examples include, among many oth-
ers, Lijphart (1977, 1999), Austen-Smith and Banks
(1988), Myerson (1993, 1999), Persson and Tabellini
(1999, 2000), Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997,
2000), Austen-Smith (2000), Lizzeri and Persico
(2001) and Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno
(2002). These papers find that proportional electoral
systems should be associated with the provision of
more public goods, larger and more universalistic
welfare programs, and a larger overall size of gov-
ernment. The results are similar for presidential
regimes that should have less provision of public
goods and a smaller size of government than parlia-
mentary systems.
The analysis of the economic effects of constitutions
has taken the constitution as given. But if constitu-
tional provisions affect fiscal policy outcomes, and
therefore the welfare of citizens, then citizens will
have preferences over these institutions and will vote
accordingly when the constitution is chosen. In other words,
constitutions should be regarded as endogenous. Our
research presented in the paper “Endogenous Con-
stitutions” (2005a, first draft in 2002), makes exactly this
point by linking the constitutional choice to the distribution
of income of the society. Our argument can be summarized
as follows. As we said, the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture finds that various constitutional features shape fiscal
policies. We know that fiscal policies in turn affect, over
time, the distribution of income. This implies that the con-
stitution is an important determinant of income inequality.
But then, should not we expect that income inequality itself
affects the selection of the constitution? In our paper, we
pose and address precisely this question, and show why and
how income inequality can be a determinant of the consti-
tution adopted. In particular, the main result of our eco-
nomic theory of constitutional choice is that a majoritarian
constitution is more likely to be chosen when the degree of
income inequality is relatively high, while consensual
democracy is more likely to be adopted by relatively more
homogeneous societies.
A new approach for explaining constitutional
choice
In Ticchi and Vindigni (2005a), we present a model
with three groups of individuals that differ in their
pre-tax income level and that we define as the rich,
the middle class and the poor.There are three group-
specific public goods, i.e. each class has its own pre-
ferred public good and does not derive utility from
the public good preferred by the other classes. The
public goods are provided by the government that
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finances them with a flat tax rate. This allows the
group(s) in power to target the redistribution to its
(their) advantage. Individuals in each class are per-
fectly homogenous, no one group has an absolute
majority and the middle class is the largest group.We
have also used the citizen-candidate framework,
where politicians cannot make a credible commit-
ment to implement policies different from their pre-
ferred one once elected.
We model majoritarian democracy as a system
where fiscal policy is chosen by a leader elected di-
rectly by the people from a list of citizen-candidates
participating in the election with a majoritarian elec-
toral system. We think this model accurately repre-
sents parliamentary systems with a majoritarian
electoral rule as well as presidential regimes charac-
terized by relatively powerful presidents. In the first
case, assuming the existence of a parliament whose
members are elected in single-candidate districts, as
in the UK, this would lead to the same political equi-
librium as long as the distribution of agents across
districts is similar to that of the whole country. In the
case of presidential regimes, there are two possibili-
ties. One is where the legislative assembly is elected
with a majoritarian electoral law as in the US. Given
that president and assembly are elected with the
same electoral rule, they should be expected to have
similar fiscal policy preferences. Therefore, indepen-
dently of the relative power of the two bodies, these
democracies are clearly majoritarian. If instead the
legislative assembly is elected with a proportional
electoral system, then understanding the powers of
the president becomes important for classifying the
democracy as majoritarian or consensual.The typical
example of presidential regimes with PR are the
Latin American countries. These countries are gen-
erally characterized by a relatively powerful presi-
dent that plays a very important role in the legisla-
tive process, and that is often also in a dominant
position with respect to the legislature. In this case,
as argued by Lijphart and Linz, these countries are
examples of majoritarian democracies. In an exten-
sion of our model (Ticchi and Vindigni 2005b), we
show that the equilibrium obtained in our model of
majoritarian democracy is very close to one generat-
ed by an institutional framework where fiscal policy
is the outcome of bargaining between a president
and an assembly elected with PR. In other words, our
finding is that what matters for fiscal policy out-
comes in presidential regimes with PR is the (majori-
tarian) electoral law employed in the presidential
election.
The result of our model of majoritarian democracy is
that the winner is a rich citizen-candidate and, there-
fore, that the fiscal policy implemented is relatively
conservative. The idea behind this result is that each
candidate will implement her preferred policy once
elected, as there is no possibility of making credible
commitments. The rich, have an advantage over the
other two groups, and will get elected, because their
optimal fiscal policy is characterized by the lowest
taxation. This makes possible that in two-candidate
contests between the rich and another group, the
rich always win. In other words, in a majoritarian
democracy the rich enjoy an advantage over the
other classes as a result of the interaction of their rel-
ative fiscal conservatism and the majoritarian elec-
toral law.
As mentioned above, consensual democracies are
characterized by coalition governments that are the
outcome of a legislative bargaining process among
the members of a parliament appointed with a pro-
portional electoral law. In our model, we obtain the
result that government coalitions depend on the dis-
tribution of income. If income inequality is low, the
government will be composed of a coalition between
the middle class and the poor (center-left) while the
coalition will be between the middle class and the
rich (center-right) when income inequality is rela-
tively high. The explanation for this result is that
when inequality is high and there are a lot of poor
people, they are relatively strong, and the middle
class will have to develop a policy that favors the
poor if it wants this class to accept a coalition gov-
ernment offer. Hence, the middle class will prefer a
coalition with the rich who are “cheaper to buy”
because they are weaker and fear that the poor will
gain more power. The opposite occurs when income
inequality is low.
We also obtain the result that a government coali-
tion between the middle class and the poor taxes and
redistributes more than a coalition between the mid-
dle class and the rich, which in turn sets higher taxes
than a government comprising the rich only (i.e. the
tax rate set in majoritarian democracy).These results
are in line with the findings of the empirical litera-
ture and with the results of other theoretical models.
The mechanism leading to this conclusion is com-
pletely new, however. In the traditional literature,
consensual democracies tax and spend more than
majoritarian ones because of the common pool
problem that characterizes coalition governments. In
our work, there is no common pool and, other things
being equal, a government coalition should tax and
spend less than a single party government. The rea-
son is that the higher the number of parties in the
government the lower is the amount for each unit of
taxation that each party appropriates through the
provision of the group-specific public good. How-
ever, in our model there is another effect moving in
the opposite direction. The classes in power in a con-
sensual democracy (middle class-poor or middle
class-rich) are on average poorer than the class
(rich) in power in majoritarian democracy. A mini-
mum degree of income inequality is enough for this
latter effect to dominate over the former.
When individuals choose the constitution, they will
consider their welfare under the two different consti-
tutional frameworks and will vote accordingly. Notice
that we assume that individuals do not choose institu-
tions behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, but are
fully informed of both their preferences and their
economic status. We regard this assumption as much
more plausible, since in practice the framers of consti-
tutions are always concrete individuals who are well
aware of their own status and interests. The result we
obtain is that a society with a relatively high income
inequality prefers a majoritarian constitution, while
consensual democracy is chosen when there is less
inequality. In fact, the rich always prefer the majori-
tarian system because they are always in power, and
the middle class always prefers the consensual model
because they are always part of the government coali-
tion and the poor end up being the swing voters.
When there is a low level of inequality in income dis-
tribution, they prefer a consensual democracy
because they will be part of the government coalition.
When inequality is higher, the poor prefer the majori-
tarian system as they know that in consensual democ-
racy they would not be part of the ruling coalition,
and this means that they would pay higher taxes with-
out receiving their preferred public good.
Our economic theory of constitutional choice has
also three interesting results. First, it helps explain
the persistency of constitutions. High inequality
leads to the choice of a majoritarian constitution
which limits the amount of income redistribution.
This leaves inequality high and the society will con-
tinue to prefer a majoritarian institutional setting.
The opposite happens when income inequality is
low. Second, there is a selection bias in the composi-
tion of the government coalitions. Consensual
democracies should be expected to be ruled more
often by center-left coalitions, more willing to tax
and redistribute income, while the more fiscally con-
servative right should have an advantage under
majoritarian constitutions. Third, the relationship
between income inequality and redistribution
obtained by our theory is not as positive as suggested
by the median voter theorem. In particular, this can
be absent or negative as inequality not only affects fis-
cal policy in a nonlinear way for a given constitution,
but it also influences the choice of the constitution
itself with more inequality favoring the choice of the
constitution (the majoritarian one) that leads to lower
income redistribution. This result is consistent with
the existing empirical evidence (e.g., Perotti 1996)
that, contrary to what is predicted by the median
voter theorem, finds a negative or no relationship
between income redistribution and income inequality.
Empirical tests
The predictions of our theory of constitutional
choice regarding fiscal policy outcomes are consis-
tent with the theoretical and empirical findings in
the literature. However, the main and new result of
our model is that constitutions are endogenous and
that more income inequality should favor the adop-
tion of a majoritarian constitution. But, is there evi-
dence supporting our theory? To answer this ques-
tion, we have addressed the problem from an econo-
metric and a historical point of view.1
The main problem in an econometric analysis that
tries to estimate the effect of income inequality on
the probability of adopting a certain constitution is
that inequality is endogenous, as it depends on the
constitution itself. The endogeneity issue is also
problematic because there does not seem to be (at
least we were not able to find one!) a valid instru-
ment for the inequality of income distribution in our
framework. To avoid problems of endogeneity, we
have therefore tested our theory by analyzing the
relationship between the type of constitution adopt-
ed and the income inequality of the country at the
time, or before, the adoption of the current constitu-
tion. This test was performed through a cross-sec-
tional analysis because, as predicted by our model,
constitutional reforms are rare events, and there are
not enough changes in constitutions to allow us to
perform a panel data analysis.2
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1 For reasons of brevity, we do not discuss the historical evidence;
the reader may find it in Ticchi and Vindigni (2005a).
2 This problem becomes even more severe when the availability of
income inequality data is taken into account.
CESifo DICE Report 3/200715
Forum
We have constructed our dataset starting from that
one compiled by Persson and Tabellini (2003) to ana-
lyze the economic effects of constitutions. This
dataset contains 85 countries selected on the base
that they can be classified as free or partly free
democracies for the period 1990–98.As a measure of
income inequality, we have used the Gini index
extracted from the dataset compiled by Deininger
and Squire (1996).
Finally we have obtained a sample of 57 democracies
and a sub-sample of 31 parliamentary democracies.
In the sample of parliamentary democracies, majori-
tarian systems have an average inequality of
10 points higher than consensual ones and this dif-
ference is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level.3 The unconditional correlation between the
Gini coefficient and a majoritarian electoral system
is 0.485. The results of logit regressions, where we
condition the relationship between income inequali-
ty and the type of constitution for different variables
that may potentially affect the choice of the consti-
tution, show that an increase of one point in the Gini
coefficient increases the probability of adopting a
majoritarian system by 3 percent. The results are
similar when we consider the whole sample. The
obtained estimates are large numbers, suggesting
that the impact of income inequality on the choice of
constitution has not only the sign predicted by our
theory but it is also quantitatively important.
Summary and open questions
In sum the conclusion of our theoretical and empir-
ical work is that income inequality is a determinant
of the constitution of a country. This has important
implications for any empirical analysis that aims at
estimating the effect of constitutional features on
economic outcomes. In fact, most works that
attempt to do this (based on cross-country analysis
because, as we said before, constitutional reforms
are rare) do not take into consideration that the
selection of a certain constitution is not random (as
our theory shows). Countries with a different con-
stitution also differ in many other characteristics
(e.g. income inequality) that affect fiscal policy out-
comes. Therefore, an empirical work that does not
tackle this issue obtains estimates that cannot be
interpreted as the causal effect of the constitution
on fiscal policy.
Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) is, to best of our
knowledge, the only work that attempts to cope with
the endogeneity issue in order to estimate causal
effects of constitutional provisions, such as the elec-
toral rules and the form of government, on fiscal pol-
icy outcomes.4 They perform an IV estimate, using as
instruments for the constitution selection, three con-
stitutional dating variables, two language indicators
and latitude, while controlling for other cultural and
geographic variables as ethno-linguistic fractional-
ization.5 They obtain that the effect of the electoral
rules and the form of government is important and
in line with the findings of the empirical and theo-
retical literature. Acemoglu (2005) argues, however,
that there are various reasons why Persson and
Tabellini’s identification strategy is unconvincing
and concludes that their estimates can only repre-
sent robust correlations between the form of gov-
ernment and electoral system with various measures
of economic and fiscal policy outcomes. Therefore,
the effect of constitutions on economic outcomes is
still an open issue.
Future research in this field will therefore have to
find a way to measure the causal effects of constitu-
tional features on economic outcomes. Our theory of
constitutional choice is a contribution to this strand
of literature suggesting the existence of economic
fundamentals (such as income inequality) that affect
fiscal policy outcomes directly, as well as indirectly
through the effect on the type of constitution adopt-
ed and that, at the same time, are affected by the fis-
cal policies implemented. This kind of endogeneity
makes the empirical analysis particularly challeng-
ing, especially because we can rely only on few cases
where the constitution has been changed, but this is
an effort that, we think is worth pursuing.
References
Acemoglu, D. (2005), “Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A
Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s The Economic Effects of
Constitutions”, Journal of Economic Literature 43(4), 1025–48.
Aghion, P., A. Alesina and F. Trebbi (2004), “Endogenous Political
Institutions”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(2), 565–611.
Austen-Smith, D. (2000),“Redistributing Income Under Propor-
tional Representation”, Journal of Political Economy 108(6),
1235–69.
Austen-Smith, D. and J.S. Banks (1988), “Elections, Coalitions, and
Legislative Outcomes”, American Political Science Review 82,
405–22.
3 The Gini coefficient is measured on a scale from 0 to 100.
4 The literature that takes into consideration the endogeneity of
political institutions in the empirical analysis about the effect of
institutions on fiscal and economic outcomes is instead abundant.
5 See Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) for the effects of ethnic
fractionalization on political institutions.
Deininger, K. and L. Squire (1996), “A New Data Set Measuring
Income Inequality”, World Bank Economic Review 10, 565–91.
Lijphart, A. (1977), Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative
Exploration, Yale University Press, New Haven.
Lijphart, A. (1999), Patterns of Democracy, Yale University Press,
New Haven.
Lizzeri, A. and N. Persico (2001), “The Provision of Public Goods
Under Alternative Political Regimes”, American Economic Review
91(1), 225–39.
Milesi-Ferretti, G. M., R. Perotti and M. Rostagno (2002),“Electoral
Systems and Public Spending”, Quarterly Journal of Economics
117(2), 609–57.
Myerson, R. B. (1993), “Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities
under Alternative Electoral Systems”, American Political Science
Review 87(4), 856–69.
Myerson, R. B. (1999), “Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral
Systems”, European Economic Review 43, 671–97.
Perotti, R. (1996), “Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy:
What the Data Say”, Journal of Economic Growth 1(2), 149–87.
Persson, T., G. Roland and G. Tabellini (1997), “Separation of
Powers and Political Accountability”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 112(4), 1163–202.
Persson,T., G. Roland and G.Tabellini (2000),“Comparative Politics
of Public Finance”, Journal of Political Economy 108(6), 1121–61.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1999), “The Size and Scope of
Government: Comparative Politics With Rational Politicians”,
European Economic Review 43(4–6), 699–735.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000), Political Economics: Explaining
Economic Policy, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2003), The Economic Effects of
Constitutions, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2004), “Constitutional Rules and Fiscal
Policy Outcomes”, American Economic Review 94(1), 25–45.
Ticchi, D. and A. Vindigni (2005a), “Endogenous Constitutions”,
Working Paper no. 896, University Pompeu Fabra.
Ticchi, D. and A. Vindigni (2005b), “Presidential Regimes with
Proportional Representation: A Model of Majoritarian Demo-
cracy”, mimeo.
CESifo DICE Report 3/2007 16
Forum
